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ABSTRACT 
 
IS SADC ON THE RIGHT PATH TOWARDS THE MONETARY UNION? AN EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE OF INFLATION AND EXCHANGE 
RATES 
 
By 
Nalla Diawara 
 
 
Using time varying technique, and updated data on inflation and exchange rate, we analyzed if 
SADC is converging on this specific variables and thus if is progressing toward the 
materialization of the monetary union in 2016.The sample comprised monthly data from 1990 to 
2012, and the results show that even though the region is showing some progress, there is no 
evidence of convergence of these variables between the member states. This is explained by the 
low level of integration in the region associated with the differences in the structure and level of 
development among the member states and the problem of overlapping membership to different 
RECs of most of the member states. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Regional economic integration was one of the options that countries both developed and 
developing found to improve and promote economic growth and development, and to face the 
challenges of a world that is becoming more globalized. 
 The European Union represents one of the most successfully experiences of regional 
integration that last for more than 50 years, and is being source of inspiration and learning for the 
other regions trying to follow its steps. A “linear model of integration describes integration in 
terms of successively deeper levels. It starts with a Free Trade Area (FTA) and then a Customs 
Union with its free trade behind a common external tariff. This is followed by a Common Market 
that adds the free flow of factors of production to a customs union and finally an Economic 
Union, which adds fiscal and monetary integration to a common market.” (CCBG 2002, 10-11). 
 In this study we want to concentrate on the further south of the African continent, where 
15 countries, namely, Angola, Botswana, Republic Democratic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, form one of the African Regional Economic Communities (REC), the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), which in 2002 the region signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Macroeconomic Convergence Program (MCP).   
The present study analysis the implementation of the SADC MCP and evaluates and measures how the 
region is performing, assuming that it’s intend to establish a monetary union by 2016.  
 We will do so, looking for two monetary variables, namely inflation rate and exchange 
rate. The variables of analysis were chosen for two reasons; first inflation is the variable that its 
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target achievement is challenging most of SADC members and Exchange rate is highly 
influenced by inflation movements, and, second, availability of data and period length for most 
of the countries of the sample. 
Besides this introductory chapter, the documents includes a literature review in chapter 
two, the model used and it results are presented in the third chapter, while the conclusion and 
recommendations are in chapter four. In the fifth and last chapter is the reference list. 
1.1. Problem Statement 
This study surges as the follow up of the findings and recommendations of previous 
studies both on the assessment of the MEC in SADC, and the feasibility of the Monetary Union 
in SADC forecasted to be in place in 2016. A first study1, conclude that SADC wasn’t ready for 
macroeconomic convergence and that could even be counterproductive because it was exposed 
to asymmetrical external shocks. However, in 2009, an initial SADC MEC performance 
evaluation 2  observed that part of SADC countries have achieved a good macroeconomic 
performance, having some even done better than the 2008 targets despite the 2012 being 
ambitious.  
Jefferis (2007), when studying the process of monetary integration in the SADC region, 
concluded that there is a core convergence group comprising the Common Monetary Area (CMA) 
countries – South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, plus Botswana, Mauritius, 
Mozambique and Tanzania whose macroeconomic performance satisfies some of the criteria for 
monetary union. The remain SADC countries – Angola, DRC, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
                                                          
1 CCBG (2002); 
2 Burgess 2009 
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make up a “non-converging” group that cannot yet be considered potential candidates for 
monetary union. 
 “The success of any ongoing efforts for achieving such a form of integration depends on the 
degree of economic convergence of national economies. A high degree of macroeconomic 
convergence would mean that both external and domestic shocks were affecting all members in a 
similar fashion and that the union-wide, common set of policies would, therefore, be appropriate.” 
(Jayaraman et al, 2007, 506) 
“While  macroeconomic convergence is an important component of the process of monetary 
union, there  is scope for debate about how much convergence has to occur  prior to the union 
take place, and how much can follow afterwards. With regard to macroeconomic indicators that 
are primarily monetary in nature such as inflation, interest rate and exchange rate, there are 
strong arguments that convergence should come prior to monetary union otherwise convergence 
will force, abruptly, as the union takes effect.” (Jefferis, 2007, 89) 
On the current SADC MEC indicators, the only monetary one, is inflation and recent evaluations, 
indicated that this one of the variable that most members might attain. 
Additional, even though the exchange rate is not part of the SADC MEC targets, we 
intend to explore the implications of the macroeconomic convergence on exchange rate policies, 
because on one hand it will impact the level of foreign exchange reserves, sources of government 
revenues, the depth of financial markets; on the other hand stabilization of exchange rate 
represents one of the main features of a monetary union, that once set cannot be changed. So if 
exchange rate is not stabilized in advance the transition process can prove disastrous. 
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1.2. Thesis Statement 
Main Claim 
According, Carmignani (2005) for a group of countries have high degree of convergence, 
they should have: 
 Large volumes of intra-regional trade; 
 Cross-country symmetry of shocks; and 
 Common institutional attributes and economic policies. 
Differently from what the theory foresees, “the SADC macroeconomic convergence initiative is 
not designed specifically to the process of monetary union; instead, it reflects a broader objective 
of achieving macroeconomic stabilization in the region as a whole. However, (…) 
macroeconomic convergence is an important prerequisite for a monetary union to be feasible.” 
(Jefferis, 2007, 95) 
“High degree of convergence would mean that both external and domestic shocks were affecting 
all member countries in a similar fashion and that a union-wide, common set of policies would 
therefore, be appropriate.” (Jayaraman et al, 2007, 506) 
“There are two aspects of convergence: nominal and real. They cover exchange rate, 
growth and inflation. In the absence of a high degree of convergence in these spheres, the cost of 
any premature integration could be disastrous.” (Jayaraman et al, 2007, 506) 
1.3. Objectives 
General Objective 
The objective of this study is investigate whether SADC members Countries as whole or the 
subgroups according its level of developments, presents any economic convergence and whether 
there exists any case at present for a monetary union. 
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Specific Objectives 
 Discuss the term “macroeconomic convergence”; 
 Identify the advantages and disadvantage of a monetary union; 
 Describe  the actual situation of SADC countries towards the monetary union; and 
 Assess the degree of convergence of inflation and exchange rates of SADC region. 
1.4. Statement of Significance 
 The issue of macroeconomic convergence program in different regional economic 
communities in Africa, including in SADC, have been topic of many academic work. Previous 
studies looked to the convergence of SADC, different variables like GDP per capita, inflation, 
Output, and so on. This study analyzes the degree of convergence of SADC and afterwards of a 
subgroup of countries with some institutional and economic similarities. 
There is consensus on the need of the macroeconomic convergence happens before the 
monetary union takes place, but the debate on the degree of convergence before and after, 
persists. In this study we will assume the position that there are macroeconomic indicators that 
“are primarily monetary in nature, such as inflation, interest rate and exchange rates” which 
should converge before the monetary union takes place. 
The question in this study is whether SADC Monetary Union is attainable. The analysis 
is conducted recognizing that, first, macroeconomic convergence is part of the process for 
monetary union; and second, SADC already took the decision to converge, so, what are the 
conditions that the region has to meet in order to successfully reach and sustain convergence in 
the region. 
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We found in the literature, specific studies on convergence pattern of SADC subgroups 
which are part of other RECs, namely SADC, EAC and COMESA. This study bring one new 
aspect which is combining different criteria, like level of income3 (low income and Middle 
income countries), political stability, economic and institutional similarities (HIPIC countries), 
forming a SADC subgroup composed by Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania e Zambia, and 
analyzed what its MEC convergence pattern and prospects.  
There are a lot of previous studies covering the issue of feasibility of SADC MCP, and 
monetary union, using different variables and methodology, varying from theoretical to empiric 
analysis.  According the variables and technique used the finds may differ, but, in general most 
studies, particularly on the feasibility of monetary union concluded that the region will not able 
to materialize it in the agreed timeline. However, most of the revised studies were conducted 
some time ago some even before the region have started the implementation of its regional 
economic integration. 
This study will add value in the discussion of the feasibility of SADC´s monetary union 
because, first, is conducted after 2012, the second reference year of the SADC MCP permitting 
the inclusion of much more recent data and developments that the region faced; second, 
application of different methodology from the previous one, and third and most important, will 
perform analysis for the whole group and sub-groups formed based on income level and political 
stability. 
 
                                                          
3 Based on 2011 World Bank Countries classification 
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1.5. Background Information on SADC 
 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) - History, Objectives and Goals 
Cooperation amongst SADC member states started in April 1980 as the Southern African 
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) of nine member countries that focused on 
common regional (mainly infrastructure) projects intended to reduce economic dependence on 
Apartheid in South Africa by forging member states links and mobilizing resources. The SADCC 
had a Summit of Heads of State or Government, Council of Ministers, a Standing Committee of 
Officials and the Secretariat. Different sectors were decentralized to each member state. As 
Namibia and South Africa gained political independence in the early 1990s, SADCC was 
transformed into an institution that goes beyond mere cooperation – the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) and began to pursue regional economic integration and 
development. Membership also grew from nine (9) to Fifteen (15). The key objectives of SADC 
are to promote equitable, self-sustaining economic growth and socio-economic development 
with a view to alleviating poverty; cultivate common cultural, social and political values, as well 
as maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; achieve complementarities, and sustainable 
environmental and resource utilization. 
1.5.1 SADC’s Regional Economic Integration Plan 
In the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan Development (RISDP), approved 
in 2003 are defined the objectives, activities and policies relevant to the achievement of a 
complete economic integration of SADC. RISDP established a roadmap for deepening regional 
integration over a 15-year period, outlining a number of targets and milestones to be met along 
the way, namely:  
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  Free Trade Area by 2008,  
  Customs Union by 20104,  
  Monetary Union by 2016, and  
  Single Currency by 2018. 
Under its Plan of economic integration SADC established a Macroeconomic 
Convergence Program (MCP) through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
Macroeconomic Convergence (MEC) that was signed and entered in force in august 2002, and 
represents the key legal framework for macroeconomic convergence targets which is part of the 
preparation of the financial market integration. The MoU on MEC “sets out modalities, 
principles, institutional arrangements, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms, 
indicators/criteria, data requirements, and monetary and fiscal policy cooperation parameters for 
the member countries. The MOU is premised on the recognition by member countries of the 
need for financial and economic stability, soundness of institutional structures and policy 
frameworks.” (Maruping, 2005, 140-141). 
Under chapter 4, priorities of intervention areas of RISP (2003), on the area of Trade, 
Economic Liberalization and Development, we have de following targets:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 According the RISDP, the SADC Customs Union was supposed to be launched in 2010, but the Summit decided to 
postpone to 2012. 
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Table 1: Trade, Economic Liberation and Development Targets for SADC  
Indicators 2008 2012 2018 
Target 5: Macroceonomic Convergence on 
Inflation rate  < 10 < 5 < 3 
Ratio of budget deficit to GDP  < 5 < 3 < 3 
Nominal Value of public and publicly guaranteed 
debt to GDP 
< 60 < 60 < 60 
Target 6: Other Financial Indicators 
External reserves/import cover  3 6 6 
Central Bank credit to Government  10 5 5 
Savings to GDP 25 30 35 
Domestic Investment to GDP  30 30 30 
Gradual interconnection of payments and clearing system in SADC by 2008 
Achieve currency convertibility by 2008 
Finalise the legal and regulatory framework for dual and cross listing on the regional stock 
exchanges by 2008 
Liberalising exchange controls: Current account transactions between Member States by 2006 
and the capital account by 2010 
Increase the share of credit accessed by women and SMEs to at least 5% of total private sector 
credit by 2008 
Target: 7 The establishment of a SADC monetary union by 2016 
Finalize preparation of institutional, administrative and legal framework for setting up a SADC 
Central Bank by 2016 
Launch a regional currency for the SADC Monetary Union by 2018 
 
In SADC the Macroeconomic Convergence Program has its legal base on Chapter Three of 
the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) and its Annex 2 where at the Preamble of the 
latest is stated that the members states are convinced that “regional economic integration and 
macroeconomic stability are preconditions to sustainable economic growth and for the creation 
of a monetary union in the Region.” 
The membership of SADC is not homogenous. Institutional constraints have also limited 
the extent to which various political level commitments have been implemented and monitored 
in terms of concrete programs of action. There are still significant disparities among many 
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member states in terms of income levels and distribution; macroeconomic performance notably 
fiscal deficits and public debt as percentages of GDP thus leading to high rates of inflation; 
financial sector development and stability; human resources; infrastructure development; as well 
as peace, security and governance. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Defining Macroeconomic Convergence 
Most of material reviewed neither clarify the concept of MEC, nor did it only in the 
specific context of respective study. That’s why we think is a good opportunity to present a short 
discussion on the concept of MEC based in previous literature and clearly states what should be 
the understanding of MEC in this particular study. MEC can be defined both in general economic 
and empirical (based on statistics and econometrics to test it) terms. 
2.1.1 Theoretical Definition 
According the definition´s article of Annex 2 of FIP, “macroeconomic convergence 
means the convergence by State Parties to low and stable levels of inflation, sustainable budget 
deficits, public and publicly guaranteed debt, and current account balances.” We can easily see 
that the definition is very specific for the purpose of the annex, but there isn´t any indication 
about the direction (level) of each indicator which might have been a good approach in the sense 
that gives some flexibility to the region when setting the respective targets for each variable. This 
position is corroborated by CCBG (2001) when stating that “Macroeconomic convergence, per 
definition, need not imply greater macroeconomic stability in the region. It is possible to 
 
 
12 
 
converge at, for example, higher and growing levels of the budget deficit, inflation and external 
balance.” 
Maruping (2005) shares similar view, but put it in terms of reasons for seeking 
macroeconomic convergence which “entails the setting of lower and/or upper limits for selected 
macroeconomic variables, is usually underpinned by the desire to guide certain key aspects of 
future economic and financial policy and its management among the member countries 
concerned.” 
On the other hand, Carmignami (2005), handle the MEC issue in terms of 
Macroeconomic policy variables. In his view, to foster economic integration in a region, the 
countries involved need to convergence in terms of their macroeconomic policies (fiscal and 
monetary), and thus can be done through establishment of a criteria for MEC. 
2.1.2. Empirical Definition 
Empirically, convergence can be defined through different methods or models to measure 
it. “Convergence is signaled by a decline in the standard deviation over time. A decrease in the 
percentage of countries falling in the tails of the distribution also indicates convergence.” 5 
Carmignani (2005) also presents the two concepts of the evidence of MEC in time-series of 
monetary variables, first introduced in Hafer and Kutan (1994) and Westbook (1998), that “Two 
series converge when they share a common stochastic trend.”6  And second by Monteuga-Gomez, 
(2002) that “Convergence between two series takes place when their time-varying difference dies 
over time.”7 
                                                          
5 Carmignami (2005, 218) 
6 Carmignami (2005) 
7 ib 
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2.2 Macroeconomic Convergence in Different RECS 
Previous studies tried to measure the level of MEC programs in different RECs. 
 Maruping (2005, 132) systematized the conditions for effective convergence as listed below: 
• Efficient and non-distortionary markets for products and factors of production, including 
free movement of capital and notably labor; 
• Effective compensatory financing arrangements to make the domestic costs of adjustment 
affordable, and equitably share the costs and benefits of integration, and fully incorporate 
the effects of exogenous shocks such as adverse weather, terms of trade, disease, and 
external financing shocks including debt relief; 
• Proper timing and sequencing as well as consensus-based choice of a convergence anchor 
(whether rigid or flexible benchmarks and criteria); 
• Enabling policies that reduce risks; 
• Development and retention of expertise; 
• Focus on smaller sub-groupings for greater success, with provision for variable geometry 
and variable/multi-speed arrangements. 
According Maruping (2005), MEC have some advantages for the countries involved either 
individually or collectively, that can be macroeconomic stability which represents a key and pre-
conditions for achieving strong and sustainable economic growth. Maruping (2005) , also does a 
good job identifying some lessons and challenges for macroeconomic convergence, namely (i) 
membership overlapping issue; (ii) slow ratification of protocols and reluctant implementation of 
agreed plans – for instance in the case of  SADC not all the member countries already ratified the 
FIP8 which represents the instrument of operationalization of the MEC; (iii) socio-economic 
                                                          
8 Countries which already ratified FIP 
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policy divergence; and (iv) limited national and regional capacities - both human and 
institutional.  
Kocenda (2001), did a empirical study to assess the MEC criteria of Central and Eastern 
European transition economies, and found that in general the countries where converging but the 
results differed for some variables with real output converging at highest degree while inflation 
at the slowest pace; and for group of countries which belongs to the Baltic states9 recording the 
highest degree and most homogenous level of convergence. He attributed this results to two main 
reasons, “First, international trade within the Central European Free Trade Area framework 
serves as a natural means of coordinating economic development. Second, the prospective 
accession to the European Union serves as an institutional means of coordination in order to 
satisfy a set of pre-accession criteria. […] common institutional features and economic policies 
tend to correlate with this higher degree of convergence. This finding is in line with the 
neoclassical growth theory that supports the occurrence of convergence among similar countries.” 
(Kocenda 2001, 22-23).  
The variables that are showing convergence in the different RECs MEC Criteria vary 
widely, in COMESA was found a “convergence in the degree of central bank financing of 
government deficit and (…) of inflation and money growth, at least for a sub-sample of countries 
in the region.” (Camargnani 2005, 219; 227).  But no evidence of convergence inflation and little 
support for convergence in exchange rate, for the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ). (Adam 
et al. 2010, 31) 
When analyzing the dynamic Macroeconomic convergence in the West Africa Monetary 
one, Adam et al (2010) observed that the exchange rate, interest rate and inflation rate have a 
role to play to minimize the effect to shocks, so that “high degree of convergence of key 
                                                          
9  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
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macroeconomic indicators would render the aspiring region suitable candidate for currency 
union. If there is no convergence in any key indicators, a common set of policies would prove 
disastrous.” (Adam et al. 2010, 39) 
Drábek (2005) identified the issues in the system that are preventing a more successful 
convergence of macroeconomic indicators, namely (i) product and factor market, they need to be 
efficient; (ii) compensatory mechanism to finance the adjustment cost; and  (iii) timing and 
sequencing of macroeconomic convergence, it should be established a speed and sequence of 
convergence that is realistic.  
2.3 Macroeconomic Convergence Program in SADC 
Rightly in the year which the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on MEC Program 
in SADC, McCarthy& Du Plessis (2001)10 prepared a study for the Committee of Central Banks 
Governors (CCBG), on the performance of indicators as external debt to GDP ratio, the budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP, growth of broad money supply (M2), CPI inflation rates, interest 
rate spreads, and current account deficits, and the overall impression gained was one of 
divergence during the 1990s and not convergence.  
Thus, at that time the CCBG concludes that “in a region like SADC, which is exposed to 
asymmetrical external shocks, convergence can in fact be counterproductive.” Their main 
argument is that MEC policy is not a sufficient condition to guarantee macroeconomic stability 
and the actual level of development of most of the SADC countries, requires that “Policies must 
be designed to address national development needs and since circumstances may differ, policies 
many times have to diverge….[  mainly in occurrence] of  asymmetrical external shocks in the 
region.” (CCBG Report 2001, 19) 
                                                          
10 Cited by the report of CCBG 
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As pointed by Jefferis (2007), the issue of how much convergence should occur before 
the monetary union takes place is being a source of debate. 
Hansohm and Shilimela (nd) observed that “in general, macroeconomic convergence has 
been more evident within SACU countries, and with exception of Mauritius, it remained low for 
the rest of SADC countries.” The conclusion was under the analysis of the tendency of four 
MEC variables, inflation, budget deficit, Public debt, savings and domestic investment ratios to 
GDP. 
Likewise, Maleleka (2007), in a report where he analyzed two particular sub-groups of 
countries of SADC namely, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 11   and Common 
Monetary Area (CMA)12 concluded that for the four primary targets “CMA and SACU countries 
have on average been stable and shown resilience in macroeconomic management. But this did 
not result in output convergence.” (11)  And there is divergence in policy and in output between 
the countries members of the two sub-groups and the rest of SADC members and thus is driven 
by “lack of comprehensive undertaking of factors that drive growth in respective countries, 
(…)[and, by] differences in underlying disturbance factors. This indicates that while the 
countries may generally be stable due to the anchor role played by South Africa, the countries 
may not be highly integrated because of the underlying structural differences.” (1) 
Analyzing the economic prerequisites and implications of monetary union in SADC, using 
inflation, interest rate and exchange rate, Jefferis (2007), concluded that: 
“There is a core ‘convergence’ group comprising the CMA countries – South Africa, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – plus Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique and Tanzania whose 
macroeconomic performance satisfies some of the criteria for monetary union. The remaining 
                                                          
11 SACU members are: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana and Swaziland. 
12 CMA Members are the SACU one, excluding Botswana 
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SADC countries – Angola, DRC, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe – make up a ‘nonconverging’ 
group that cannot yet be considered potential candidates for monetary union. However, even 
within the convergence group, countries remain far from satisfying the other prerequisites for 
monetary union, including significant intra-regional trade, and full capital and labour mobility. ” 
(Jefferis 2007,83) 
Agbeyegbe (2008), using the same variables (exchange rate and inflation) that we will be 
looking at, in this study, but using a different methodology – the time varying parameters, also 
analyzed the feasibility of the SADC monetary union, had concluded that was no-convergence, 
so at that time, “the chances of SADC member countries satisfying some form of Maastricht-
type criteria is quite low.”(150) 
 
Using econometric techniques to realize a statistical analysis of the macroeconomic 
performance of Botwsana, Namibia and Zambia, Ogbokor and Chakanhga (2011) found that 
there was fair favorable economic performance by Botswana and Namibia during 1990 and 2007 
while Zambia had an unfavorable economic performance from 1990 until late 2002. But, what 
really brought our attention to this study was the finding that “each country had a different 
variable that determined its economic performance better than the other did. Policies put in place 
to ensure that the set targets are being achieved are not as efficient yet as the impact of the MoU 
and its policies are yet to be felt.” They recommended further research on all the indicators to 
allow policy implementers to recognize what the main focus should be in achieving regional 
integration and other SADC objectives. 
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2.4 Monetary Union  
A monetary union is part of a broad objective of monetary integration process which basically 
represents a greater harmonisation and linking of monetary and exchange rate policies, involving 
the following stages: 
Table 2:  Degree of Monetary Integration 
POLICY 
CHOICES 
DEGREE OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 
None Weak Strong Full 
Exchange rate Floating Constrained float/crawling peg Fixed peg single 
currency 
Capital 
Market 
Exchange(cap
ital Controls 
possible 
Progressive removal of capital controls, Equal treatment across 
jurisdictions 
Other  Removal of controls on labour 
mobility, Stricter limits on 
fiscal deficits and public debt, 
trade liberalization, 
stabilization of financial sector 
and strengthening of 
supervision 
  
Monetary 
policy 
implications 
Unconstrained constrained by exchange rate 
targets  and capital movements 
Co-ordinated 
movements in 
interest rates 
single central 
bank and 
benchmark 
interest rate 
Source: Keith (2007) 
 
2.4.1  Advantages of a Monetary Union 
• Elimination of currency conversion costs; 
• Reduction of currency transactions costs on products and services as well as costs 
associated with exchange rate fluctuations; 
• Promotion of  trade; 
• Efficiency gains; 
• Improvements in quality and credibility of macroeconomic policymaking; and 
• Higher economic growth. 
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2.4.2 Disadvantages of a Monetary Union 
 
• Possible difficult of having a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy and choice of 
appropriate fiscal policy; 
• Need of continuing structural reforms; 
• Unclear relation between the monetary union and higher growth rates; 
• The cost of ceding of monetary and exchange rate policy autonomy, where the range of 
policy instruments available to national governments is reduced, and there a need for the 
government find other instruments to adjust in case of economic shocks; 
• Need to have common Key policy instruments across a group of countries and those 
countries should be individually subject to similar shocks; 
• Have similar trade structure, which could help facing shocks, since in case of small open 
economies, as the case of most of SADC countries, they are highly subjected to external 
shocks; and 
• Diversify economies in order to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks 
According the optimal Currency Area (OCA) under monetary union arrangements, the countries 
involved should have additional flexibility of the fiscal policy. But this position is controversial 
because the usage of fiscal policy to adjust from negative shocks can cause problems of public 
debt sustainability and budget deficits in one country and can cause negative externalities for the 
rest members of the union in the cases which additional borrowing and recourse to capital 
markets cause pressure for the interest rate increases. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To empirically measure the degree of economic convergence of SADC towards the 
creation of a monetary union, we follow the methodology used by Jayaraman, et al (2007) and 
Adam, et al (2010).  
According Hall et al. (1992), cited by Jayaraman et al (2007) and Adam et al. (2010), 
convergence is an issue related to long-run behavior of a number of time series. The same 
authors recall the fact that time series of economic data are in general non-stationary, while two 
time series cannot cointegrate if they are non-stationary. One important caution made by is Hall 
et al (1992) is that testing for cointegration of the series is a necessary condition but not a 
sufficient to conclude that two variables are converging, as can be shown in the following static 
linear regression:  
(1)                                   )ln(ln)ln(ln tUSRSAiSADCRSA tXXbatXX µ+−+=−  
Where
error term - (t)
lyrespective  USA,of and (i)country 
 SADCgiven  a of Africa,South  of Republic of rateinflation or  rate exchange nominal ,X ,
iSADC
µ
−USARSA XX
 
iSADCRSA0
X  Xbetween  eConvergenc       0)( : andtbH =  
 iSADCRSA1 X  Xbetween  eConvergenc-No       0)( : andtbH ≠  
USSADC1 X  Xbetween  eConvergenc       1)( : i andtbH =   
From the timeframe established for the achievement of the targets, we can see in fact 
convergence is a process, and this aspect would be better captured measuring empirically, 
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assuming some dynamic adjustments in the form of time varying parameters. For that, we 
incorporate dynamic adjustments by formulating a model with time varying parameters. 
According Jayaraman et al (2007), by applying a Kalman Filter model, we can capture two 
distinct aspects: (i) the evolution of a set of unobserved variables, the state variables over time; 
and (ii) a measurement which describes how well the actually observed data are generated from 
the state variables. 
Time varying parameters – Kalman Filter 
A Kalman Filter model in this case can be describe by the following state space model: 
(2)                                      )())(ln)(ln()())(ln( ttXXtbtatXLnX USRSAiSADCRSA µ+−+=−
 
Where, 
(4)                                                                                                  )()(
(3)                                                                                                  )()(
21
11
t
t
Vtbtb
Vtata
+=
+=
−
−  
serror term -  , 2t1 VV t  
Hypothesis: 
H0: b(t) ≠ 0   → No-convergence on the fact that relationship between XRSA and XSADCi is 
affected by  the relationship XRSA and XUS  (Specific alternative) 
H1: a(t) ≠0 and b(t) = 0 → Convergence  If XRSA and XSADCi are unaffected by the specific 
alterative. (General alternative) 
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3.1 Variables and Data 
The data was obtained from the International Financial Statistics database of IMF, CD-Room 
version, July 2012, for the following variables, frequency, period and countries: 
• Inflation rate (Logarithm of CPI Index): Monthly data, 1993:7 – 2011:9 (219 
observations), for Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
• Exchange rate (Logarithm of SDR per national currency): Monthly data, 1980:1 – 
2011:9 (381observations), for Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania. 
• Inflation and Exchange rate of United States of America, for correspondent periods. 
We will use time series because: 
 Cross-section generally rejects no-convergence (meaning convergence), while time series, 
accepted no convergence. 
 Cross-section test cannot identify grouping of countries which are converging. 
All calculations were performed on E-views. 
Limitations 
• Difference on countries coverage for both variables; 
• Difference of period covered of the two variables; and 
• Data shortage for some countries, like Mozambique. 
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IV. EMPIRAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
The tables 9 and 10 in ANNEX present the descriptive statistics of inflation and exchange rate of 
the SADC selected countries and USA. The descriptive shows that the hypothesis of normality 
cannot be accepted. Both variables are positively skewed in all the countries with exception of 
Seychelles, which exchange rate are negatively skewed.   
Angola and Mozambique show the most volatile exchange rate, while, Zambia and Malawi are 
the one with highest volatility of their inflation rates. 
 
4.2 Convergence Test 
Was conducted a co-integration test because is a necessary condition for testing existence or not 
of convergence between different series. Applying the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) was 
found that with exception of Angola´s exchange rate series all other series are non-stationary and 
integrated of order I (1).   
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4.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
Table 3: Log of Inflation 
  Levels   1st Difference 
  
ADF 
Statistics P-Value   
ADF 
Statistics P-Value 
BWA 18.42406 1.00 
 
-4.20962 0.000 
MDG 4.054865 1.00 
 
-8.29023 0.000 
MOZ 3.830652 1.00 
 
-4.86255 0.000 
MUS 13.00509 1.00 
 
-5.62287 0.000 
MWI 2.773397 0.9987 
 
-5.07778 0.000 
NAM 2.775934 0.9987 
 
-14.4229 0.000 
SWZ 5.470826 1.00 
 
-13.7856 0.000 
SYC 2.684783 0.9983 
 
-10.8583 0.000 
USA 4.492851 1.00 
 
-7.33041 0.000 
TZA 4.286402 1.00 
 
-12.562 0.000 
ZAM 4.248561 1.00 
 
-5.29475 0.000 
ZFA 7.585978 1.00   -4.25637 0.000 
 
Table 4: Log of Exchange Rate 
  Levels   1st Difference 
  
ADF 
Statistics P-Value   
ADF 
Statistics P-Value 
AGO -2.727463 0.01 
 
-23.8554 0.000 
BWA 2.941048 1.00 
 
-17.5198 0.000 
LSO 2.046217 0.99 
 
-17.6805 0.000 
MOZ 0.153957 0.73 
 
-20.8275 0.000 
NAM 1.639599 0.9756 
 
-14.348 0.000 
MUS 3.510088 0.9999 
 
-20.8807 0.000 
SWZ 1.673547 0.98 
 
-14.7639 0.000 
SYC 0.972109 0.9125 
 
-16.6436 0.000 
TZA 3.35667 1.00 
 
-9.57094 0.000 
USA 0.12035 0.72 
 
-17.9548 0.000 
ZFA 2.046217 0.99   -17.6805 0.000 
 
As Hall et al (1992) observed, “if two non-stationary time series are not co-integrated, then they 
cannot converge” but testing for co-integration is just a necessary condition but not sufficient. 
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4.2.2  Co-integration Tests 
 
Table 5: Log of Inflation 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Max-
Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
None 387.5430* 239.2354 135.4366* 64.50472 
At most 1 252.1064* 197.3709 58.14794* 58.43354 
At most 2 193.9585* 159.5297 52.64478* 52.36261 
At most 3 141.3137* 125.6154 44.88694 46.23142 
At most 4 96.42673* 95.75366 31.70666 40.07757 
At most 5 64.72007 69.81889 24.30591 33.87687 
At most 6 40.41416 47.85613 20.26849 27.58434 
At most 7 20.14567 29.79707 10.98074 21.13162 
At most 8 9.164925 15.49471 7.367754 14.26460 
At most 9 1.797171 3.841466 1.797171 3.841466 
 
Trace test indicates 5 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
Table 6: Log of Exchange Rate 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
None   364.3378*  197.3709  115.1371*  58.43354 
At most 1   249.2007*  159.5297  95.04105  52.36261 
At most 2  154.1596*  125.6154  47.55434*  46.23142 
At most 3   106.6053*  95.75366  34.87979  40.07757 
At most 4   71.72551*  69.81889  27.29167  33.87687 
At most 5  44.43384  47.85613  15.84398  27.58434 
At most 6  28.58985  29.79707  14.44005  21.13162 
At most 7  14.14981  15.49471  11.90959  14.26460 
At most 8  2.240218  3.841466  2.240218  3.841466 
Trace test indicates 5 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
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The Trace and Maximum-Eigen test statistics for inflation and exchange rates give support to the 
existence of co-integration among the variables, suggesting that the countries may be more 
readily candidates for monetary union, but are not a sufficient condition. 
First we will run the static model expressed above to confirm if there is convergence in the actual 
situation of the selected SADC member states. 
4.2.3 Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) Regression Results - Static Model 
 
The tables 7 and 8 below present the results for the equation 
(1)                                   )()(ln)ln( ttXXbatXLnX USRSAiSADCRSA µ+−+=−  
For testing the following hypothesis: 
iSADCRSA0
X  Xbetween  eConvergenc       0)( : andtbH =  
iSADCRSA1
X  Xbetween  econvergenc-No       0)( : andtbH ≠  
According the results obtained after running the equation above in E-views and looking for the 
values of the t-statistic, and comparing with the critical values of 1.714, 2.069 and 2.807, for 
two-tailed 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively, we reject the null hypothesis that b(t) 
is equal to zero, meaning, that there is no-convergence between the inflation rate levels of any of 
the countries of SADC member countries included in the sample and of South Africa, as shown 
in the table 7 below. 
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Table 7:  Inflation Rate 
        
 Country 
^
a  
 
t-stat. ^b     t-stat.      R
2 DW P-Value 
BWA 0.033759 9.716983 -0.60696 -33.9165 0.84 0.030 0.000 
MAD 0.10922 13.41665 -1.33449 -31.8255 0.82 0.040 0.000 
MOZ 0.117964 10.16568 -1.63322 -27.3241 0.77 0.02 0.000 
MUS -0.00395 -1.965 0.043485 4.204202 0.08 0.05 0.000 
MWI 0.287728 15.8542 -3.35647 -35.9054 0.86 0.02 0.000 
NAM -0.06559 -12.3893 0.409343 15.01211 0.51 0.1 0.000 
SWZ 0.035534 15.61224 -0.39141 -33.3858 0.84 0.29 0.000 
SYC -0.12516 -12.7441 0.18792 3.714684 0.06 0.02 0.0003 
TZA 0.018506 2.249577 -0.77278 -18.2376 0.61 0.06 0.0255 
ZAM 0.339737 24.85221 -3.54558 -50.353 0.92 0.01 0.000 
T-statistic critical values, 10% = 1.714, 5% = 2.069, 1% = 2.807 
*denotes no-rejection of H0: b(t) = 0 (convergence) 
 
 
For the case of the exchange rate, using the level of t-statistic criteria, we could conclude that the 
results don’t give enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that the exchange rate of Namibia and 
Swaziland exchange rate are converging towards the South African one as the table 8 below 
reports, the associated to coefficient b(t) of Namibia are significant for 1 percent and 5 percent 
confidence level. This result is not surprising, because South Africa and Namibia are both 
members of a Common Monetary Area13 , the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), under the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Of the members of SACU, only Botswana is not party, which after joining quitted in 1976. 
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Table 8: Nominal Exchange Rate 
 Country   t-stat. 
 
    t-t-stat.      R
2 DW P-Value 
AGO -22.319 -50.510 -11.103 -37.351 0.770 0.020 0.000 
BWA -0.102 -9.478 0.091 12.534 0.290 0.030 0.000 
MOZ -0.593 -4.690 -1.252 -14.733 0.360 0.030 0.000 
NAM -0.006 -2.363    -0.003* -1.756 0.008 1.630 0.000 
MUS 2.251 218.294 0.459 66.198 0.920 0.090 0.000 
SYC 1.745 63.396 0.942 50.892 0.870 0.020 0.000 
TZA 2.515 40.662 -1.308 -31.441 0.720 0.030 0.000 
T-statistic critical values, 10% = 1.714, 5% = 2.069, 1% = 2.807 
*denotes no-rejection of H0: b(t) = 0 (convergence), at 5% of significance 
 
Using the static model, the figures obtained don’t support the existence of convergence between 
the SADC members countries considered in the sample. But these results are not sufficient for 
reaching a final conclusion. Before doing so, we will measure the convergence using a dynamic 
model, applying Kalman Filter method. 
4.2.4 Dynamic Model Results – Kalman Filter 
 
Applying a kalman Filter model as expressed in the equation (2) – (4) above, we obtained the 
series in ANNEX A, which respective visual result is as presented in the figures 1 and 2 below.  
Figure 1: State  Variables Coefficients B (t) for Exchange Rate  
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Figure 2: State Variables Coefficients  b (t) for inflation  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyzed the feasibility of the SADC monetary union program under the current 
situation. That was done assessing the actual level of convergence of the inflation rate and 
exchange rate, using both a static and dynamic models.  
First studies concluded that the SADC member as a whole are not converging in most of their 
macroeconomic variables, like inflation, GDP growth, interest rate, exchange rate. Thus the 
monetary union was unfeasible, mainly because their economies are heterogeneous and they face 
the problem of overlapping membership to different RECs. 
Using the Static Model, in a sample of 10 SADC member countries, out of 15, due to data 
availability, in the case of inflation rate, the results show that there no-convergence between any 
of the countries towards the South African one. For the exchange rate, the results demonstrates 
that Namibia and Zambia Exchange rate present a level of convergence towards the South Africa 
one, but this can be explained by the fact of this three countries be part of a REC which is 
already  in monetary union. 
We recognize that the results are not conclusive, but we believe that they represent a 
continuation and consolidation of the finding of previous studies, and in this sense a source of 
information for the policy makers involved in the process of regional integration.  
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VII. ANNEX 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of SADC and USA Exchange Rates 
 AGO BWA LSO MOZ NAM MUS SWZ SYC TZA USA ZFA 
 Mean  10374840  0.338229  0.288973  0.611858  0.289996  0.043793  0.290044  0.125070  0.018290  0.750177  0.288973 
 Median  118.2780  0.231846  0.176372  0.030215  0.176388  0.038214  0.176388  0.138227  0.001199  0.729474  0.176372 
 Maximum  34721300  1.062790  1.058850  2.713760  1.053840  0.100000  1.053840  0.147018  0.106355  1.042300  1.058850 
 Minimum  0.006671  0.083303  0.065101  0.005501  0.064392  0.019359  0.064392  0.039140  0.000387  0.608090  0.065101 
 Std. Dev.  13426888  0.274434  0.271354  1.062463  0.272038  0.022560  0.272082  0.026955  0.032951  0.095543  0.271354 
 Skewness  0.623591  1.283461  1.536633  1.329658  1.520966  0.988015  1.520151 -2.040698  1.686271  1.071090  1.536633 
 Kurtosis  1.514845  3.500614  4.122904  2.794103  4.066304  3.034939  4.063177  5.801657  4.169320  3.546910  4.122904 
            
 Jarque-Bera  59.70827  108.5803  169.9557  112.9403  164.9469  62.00645  164.6839  389.0497  202.2689  77.59771  169.9557 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
            
 Observations  381  381  381  381  381  381  381  381  381  381  381 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of SADC and USA Inflation Rates 
 BWA MDG MOZ MUS MWI NAM SWZ SYC USA TZA ZAM ZFA 
 Mean  88.98517  83.52828  83.13738  92.12662  75.27703  98.56077  88.40132  105.5704  93.78899  89.86937  73.26267  91.59531 
 Median  80.91510  73.19500  73.48260  88.08530  71.92540  97.10370  87.30270  92.85380  92.52830  86.36060  59.25080  91.32220 
 Maximum  172.0780  174.3050  174.0010  146.5750  176.9150  149.0330  154.7390  193.9230  116.1800  176.3040  180.5170  148.4980 
 Minimum  38.01120  17.14390  11.88700  51.09970  5.313350  55.78170  38.69800  73.63800  73.94070  20.41710  6.196030  48.27810 
 Std. Dev.  38.10435  43.51810  44.26949  28.34815  50.98439  24.01443  33.21404  38.41628  12.37745  36.52364  54.56656  28.24613 
 Skewness  0.569760  0.518093  0.382149  0.392137  0.257502  0.320953  0.371992  1.410444  0.159823  0.271994  0.461556  0.361244 
 Kurtosis  2.136258  2.127789  2.073440  1.932671  1.775924  2.406127  1.988367  3.490006  1.750522  2.464218  1.876347  2.081766 
             
 Jarque-Bera  18.65660  16.73918  13.16432  16.00779  16.09277  6.978139  14.38932  74.80230  15.17824  5.319736  19.29693  12.45691 
 Probability  0.000089  0.000232  0.001385  0.000334  0.000320  0.030529  0.000751  0.000000  0.000506  0.069957  0.000065  0.001972 
             
Observations  219  219  219  219  219  219  219  219  219  219  219  219 
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